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Lead Articles

Understanding bank regulation
New approaches to improving the Bank Oversight System
by Don Allen Resnikoff

Introduction

Don Allen Resnikoff is an attorney with
the United States Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division in
Washington, D.C. He was formerly in
practice with the New York firm of Turk,
Marsh, Kelly and Hoare. Mr. Resnikoff
received his J.D. from New York
University School of Law and his B.S.
from Rutgers University.
Views expressed in this article are the
responsibility of the author, and are not
necessarily the same as views of the
Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice. Thanks to
Laraine Laudati for suggesting some of
the legislative history and other
citations and for providing legal
insights important to this article.
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In 1991 and 1992 alarms sounded
about a looming bank crisis. The popular press raised the specter of commercial bank failures matching in magnitude the many failures of savings and
loan institutions.I The 1992 book Banking on the Brink, by Roger Vaughn and
Edward Hill, explained that "perhaps
2
1,200 banks are functionally insolvent."1
The hundreds of banks that in 1991
and 1992 were feared to be on the brink
of failure have not failed.3 The popular
press no longer focuses on reports of an
impending crisis for commercial banks.
The debate about bank solvency has
continued, but it has moved off the front
pages of general circulation newspapers and into the world of bankers, interest groups, and political policy insiders.
Bankers and many policy insiders
continue to argue that United States
banking is in financial trouble in the
sense that many banks are functionally
insolvent or at risk of becoming functionally insolvent. Some also argue that
Congress should address the problem of
weak banks by reforming bank regulation and making it more permissive.
Both arguments are summarized in a
recent article stating that "the [banking]
industry is within reach of real reform
as leaders in Washington and the states
begin to sound warnings that banks need
help." The article quotes Comptroller
of the Currency Eugene Ludwig as saying that the bank industry's recent profitability "lulls us into a false sense of
security" that obscures "the important

fact that the banking industry has been
in a secular decline.... Derrick Cephas,
New York's Superintendent of Banking, agrees, saying that banking is "vulnerable to periodic crisis unless certain
structural issues are addressed." Mr.
Cephas advocates legislation permitting banks to branch anywhere in the
country, and permitting banks to sell
securities and insurance. He also advocates that other regulatory burdens on
banks be reduced. 4
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, expressed similar views on legislative reform.
Greenspan chided Congress for keeping banks "in a competitive straightjacket," and said that outdated laws, not a
growing array of competitors, could be
the cause of banking industry decline.
The Chairman advocated legislation
permitting banks to branch with fewer
restrictions, and expressed the view that
congressional passage of permissive
branching legislation is imminent. He
also advocated legislation permitting
banks to deal in securities and insurance, and complained of lack of congressional action. "I am struck by the
continued unwillingness of Congress to
authorize banks to compete more
broadly in securities underwriting and
5
insurance sales."
Whether many banks are in financial
trouble, whether help is needed from
Congress, and how best to structure the
help, are questions of importance not
only to bankers and policy insiders. The
questions are important to a wide variety of people in their roles as taxpayers
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and consumers of bank services, as well
as interested citizens. Taxpayers in particular have reason to be interested in
the prospects for further taxpayer
financed "bailouts" of troubled banks,
which involve paying for the losses that
occur when a troubled bank is either
liquidated or merged into a healthier
institution.
The books analyzed in this article
can help the person without experience
in bank regulation to understand some
current issues of bank regulation policy.
The books discuss the question of
whether there really is a continuing problem with the financial condition of a
substantial number of United States
banks, and whether as a result there is
potential for bank failures that can cause
problems for bank consumers and taxpayers. The books also discuss whether
changes in bank regulation policy would
help solve the problem. The books analyze the banking industry's principal
proposed solution. This solution is reduced government regulation, including relaxed restrictions on bank participation in securities and insurance sales.
The rationale for the bankers' solution
is that reduced regulation will permit
banks additional opportunities to make
profit. The thought is that the more
profitable banks are, the less likely they
are to fail and put a burden on taxpayers.
The bankers' recommendation of
reduced regulation is rejected in the
Vaughn and Hill book. Vaughn and Hill
express skepticism that reduced regulation is the right way to avoid bank
failures. As discussed later in this article, Vaughn and Hill recommend regulating banks more strictly to require
high levels of solvency, so that banks
will not fail. To some extent Congress
accepted the strict approach to regulation when it increased regulatory strictures on banks.
Other approaches to regulation, represented by the Litan and Pierce books,
attempt to fine tune regulation and focus it narrowly on well defined public
interests. As discussed subsequently,
Volume 6 Number 4 / Summer 1994

the Litan and Pierce books define protection of government insured bank deposits and avoidance of taxpayer bailout of banks as important public interests, and suggest regulation narrowly
focused on the goal of preventing bankers from engaging in activity that puts
insured deposits at risk. These carefully
tailored solutions intend to protect government insured deposits from possible
risky activity by bankers while avoiding unnecessary constraint on pursuit of
profit.
To put the various regulatory approaches in perspective, subsequent sections of this article provide: (1) a brief
overview of the existing United States
bank regulatory scheme; (2) a description of changes in the marketplace that have damaged the
profitability of banks and arguably put the current regulatory scheme in jeopardy; (3)
further discussion of bankers'
proposals for regulatory reforms that would permit
a
broader business activity for
banks; (4) a detailed exposition of the views of authors
Vaughn and Hill favoring strict regulation; (5) a detailed exposition of Litan' s
and Pierce's tailored approach to regulation; (6) a detailed discussion of recent Congressional response to regulation issues, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act of
1991 (FDICIA); (7) a report of some
comments of participants in a conference on the FDICIA; and (8) a concluding comment.
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Deposit insurance helps depositors, but
it also helps banks by making the banking business less susceptible to failure.
The very existence of government deposit insurance creates what is sometimes referred to as a "moral hazard,"
meaning that bankers will put bank assets at risk with less care than if there
were no insurance. The "moral hazard"
concern is essentially the same as for
insurance generally, and involves the
tendency of those who have the benefit
of insurance to take risks that would be
considered imprudent by uninsured persons.7 The tendency of insurance to encourage risky behavior leads to a perceived need for the government to regulate the risks that banks are allowed to

Litan and Pierce suggest
regulationsnarrowly
focused on preventing
bankersfrom engaging in
ctivity thatputs insured
deposits at risk.

1. A Brief Overview of United
States Bank Regulation
A key feature of the United States
bank regulatory scheme is governmentbacked deposit insurance, which is perceived by many as having great public
benefits, including increased stability
of banks and reduction of risk for small
bank depositors.6 Because of deposit
insurance, depositors have no need to
withdraw deposits from troubled banks.

take. Indeed, the United States regulatory scheme may be seen as involving a
balancing of, on one hand, deposit insurance and other government "safety
net" protection intended to make banking stable and profitable, and, on the
other hand, government imposed limits
on bank activity intended to avoid the
moral hazard of undue risk taking by
8
bankers in reliance on the safety net.
The government safety net includes,
in addition to deposit insurance, bank
access to funding from the Federal Reserve "discount window."9 This name
derives from the Fed practice of providing funding to banks by buying commercial paper at a varying discount rate.
At one time the Federal Reserve did so
through an actual teller's window. There
has also been some legal protection
against unbridled competition: entry of
new competition has been controlled by
statute."° Until the 1970s banks had a
109
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cheap source of funds in the form of
legally assured low interest rate deposits." Another part of the safety net has
been the "too big to fail" policy of
regulators which has protected large
banks, but not smaller banks, from fail12
ure.
The success of the United States bank
regulatory scheme depends on banks
having the ability to be profitable. If
banks cannot be profitable, the consequence is bank failures that put stress on
the government's arrangement for insuring deposits. This leads to taxpayer
bailouts of insolvent banks and a series
of other possible dire consequences. In
addition, distressed banks cannot do
well at a variety of things banks are
expected to do, including facilitating
the Federal Reserve Board's various
policies affecting money supply and
interest rates, and making loans to small
businesses.
2. The Recent Deterioration of
Bank Profitability
There is little doubt that the banking
business and the functioning of the government safety net has changed over the
years. This change has damaged the
profit-making ability of United States
banks, and increased the likelihood of
bank failures. The significant disagreement is about how serious the damage
is, and what regulatory policy approach
is appropriate to repair the damage.
A core activity of banks that has
suffered recently is "intermediation,"
where banks serve as financial intermediaries in business transactions by making loans and financing those loans by
use of customer deposits or other assets.
Banks hold assets representing a fraction of the value of loans outstanding as
a reserve. In the past, banks were protected in the intermediation function
not only by access to low interest customer deposits and the other "safety
net" legal protection discussed above,
but also by favorable market conditions. Only banks had access to knowledge of the customer's financial viabil110

ity, the risks of the particular transaction to be financed, and the types of
loans suitable to the situation.
At present, banks' unique access to
credit information has been eroded by
technological advances in communications, which facilitate easy transmittal
of information relevant to lending decisions. Also, banks have lost much of
their power to command low-cost funds
provided by low interest deposits. New
competitors for deposits have arisen,
such as non-bank offerors of mutual
funds, and legal regulations assuring
low interest payments to depositors by
banks have been dropped as counterproductive for banks. Once the banks
had non-bank competitors offering depositors similar but higher interest paying investment alternatives, legal requirements that banks pay low interest
to depositors no longer helped banks
compete. The result is that banks must
hustle to compete for funds in financial
markets, and have no special way to get
cheap funds.
Bankers and others report that another recent problem for banks is that
businesses that once would have been
borrowers from banks now often obtain
funds elsewhere. Larger businesses obtain funds by issuing securities more
frequently than in the past. Other large
borrowers have moved to issuing commercial paper rather than borrowing
from banks. Other new competitors to
banks are specialty lenders, such as vendors that make loans for purchase of
such products as cars and industrial
equipment.' 3 Consequently, banks feel
pressured to make up for the loss of
traditional lending business by taking
on more risky loans and other more
risky business.
If reports of marketplace changes
are correct, then the financial problems
of at least some banks are not likely to
go away easily. If banks can no longer
rely on low interest rate deposits for
cheap funds, and banks face serious
non-bank competition for many categories of lending, then it is not obvious

how banks can do as well financially in
the future as they have done in the past.
In Banking on the Brink, authors
Vaughn and Hill argue that while market changes have affected banks' ability
to find inexpensive assets and good customers for loans, bankers have greatly
exaggerated the consequences of market changes. Vaughn and Hill believe
that many banks survive in good condition. They explain: "America now has
two banking industries. One is strong,
profitable and internationally competitive. The other is dying. Of the world's
20 most profitable big banks, half are
American (none is Japanese and only
one is German). The average rate of
return on equity for the top half of the
industry is easily competitive with other
sectors of the economy."' 4
In addition, Vaughn and Hill contend that many of the United States
banks that are doing badly are simply
suffering from poor management leading to bad loans to foreign governments,
imprudent real estate investors, oil investors, and others.' 5
3. The Bankers' View of
Regulatory Reform
If there have been at least some
substantial market changes adverse to
banks, and at least some banks are in
great difficulty, what regulatory changes
are likely to help avoid bank failures?
Bankers often argue that the solution to
the banking industry's problems is reduced regulation. Arguments for reduced regulation sometimes include
proposals to eliminate government provided deposit insurance, but deregulation proposals recently urged on Congress have generally not gone that far.
Deregulation arguments have focused
on statutes and regulations that limit the
business activities of United States
banks. A particular target is a law that
keeps banks away from commercial
activities such as sales of securities and
insurance, and which have the purpose
of avoiding risky activity by banks.
Another target is a law that limits geoLoyola Consumer Law Reporter
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graphic expansion of banks. Possible
repeal of both kinds of limiting statutes
has been a major focus of recent Con16
gressional attention.
A. Separation of Commercial and
Investment Banks. The Glass-Steagall
Act limits the business activity of banks
by creating a wall of separation between commercial banking and investment banking. Securities underwriting
by banks is constrained by the Act. 7
Glass-Steagall is supplemented by the
Bank Holding Company Act, which
prohibits bank holding companies or

Opponents of the firewall concept
argue that it needlessly damages banks'
opportunities for profit, possibly leading to financial problems for many banks
and even failure for some. These problems cause stress on deposit insurance
and other elements of the regulatory
structure. Separating banking and commerce decreases bank safety and soundness because banks have fewer sources
of capital than if banking and commerce
were allowed to coexist. Opponents also
argue that firewalls prevent synergies
that would result from combining commercial banking and investment banking within one
Expansion of banking
entity. However, other maactivity into securities could jor capitalist economies,
such as Germany and Jalead to an unwise expanSion
pan, permit greater interof the government safet!, net. twining of commercial
banking and industrial intheir non-bank subsidiaries from many
vestment than is permitted in the United
non-bank activities. 8 The stated purStates. But for some people in this counpose of the Glass-Steagall Act is to
try the expansion of banks into indusprovide for the safety and more effectrial business raises the specter of extive use of the Federal Reserve Banks as
cessive concentrations of economic
a source of bank funds and to prevent
power.
Not everyone agrees that Glassthe undue diversion of bank funds into
speculative business investment. In other
Steagall firewalls are bad. Some argue
words, Glass-Steagall limits the scope
that repeal of Glass-Steagall would
of bank activity in order to reduce risky
impair bank safety and soundness by
activity by bankers in reliance on depermitting highly risky activity. The
posit insurance and other government
argument is that expansion of banking
safety net protection.
activity to securities could lead to unThe Glass-Steagall "firewall" conwise expansion of the government safety
net and create a moral hazard that bankcept has been weakened over the years.
Federal Reserve regulations have been
ers will take great risks over an exmodified to permit, for example, limpanded range of financial activities. In
ited stock selling by special bank subeffect, the federal government would
sidiaries. 9 Also, the Comptroller of the
guarantee not only traditional banking
Currency has given permission for some
activities, but also the additional types
bank "self-underwriting" of securities.20
of financial activity allowable to banks
Federal Reserve Board Regulation K
after repeal of the Glass-Steagall repermits United States banks to engage
strictions. In the event of a severe ecoin some securities transactions overseas
nomic downturn, the federal guarantee
that are not permitted in the United
of expanded bank activities would reStates. 2' Nevertheless, to a substantial
quire a bailout of tremendous proporextent the firewall separation of banktions.
ing and securities underwriting has reB. Limits on Bank Branches. The
mained intact.
McFadden Act of 192722 initiated another kind of limit on the business activ-

I
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ity of banks, a restriction against free
branching. National banks may establish branches only within the home state
and only as extensively as state law
permits state-chartered banks to branch.
State banks may establish interstate
branches only if a specific interstate
agreement permits it. Bank holding companies may not acquire a bank in another state unless the laws of the second
state specifically authorize the acquisition.23
Some recent liberalization of geographic restrictions on banks has occurred. For instance, some states have
eased restrictions on branching and interstate banking. Federal regulatory authorities have offered interstate branching opportunities as an incentive to banks
acquiring failing thrift institutions. To a
great extent, however, the old prohibitions on branching remain in effect.
Bankers, particularly those from
large banks, argue against the geographic constraints of the McFadden
Act and Douglas Amendment. They
argue that geographic constraints cause
the American banking business to be
less efficient and more fragmented than
would otherwise be the case. Defenders
of geographic restraints, including small
regional banks, fear that repeal of the
McFadden Act would cause industry
consolidation into fewer but larger
banks, and that small businesses and
community institutions would be less
well served.
4. Vaughn and Hill: A Strict
Approach to Regulation
Vaughn and Hill find relatively little
value in the previously discussed regulatory reform proposals that would permit an expanded scope of activity to
banks. Vaughn and Hill are cynical about
the claimed benefits of repeal of the
McFadden, Glass-Steagall, and the
Bank Holding Acts. "On balance, repealing these three laws appears to offer
modest gains for both banks and consumers, though such benefits would remain mainly a sideshow to the main
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issues facing American banking ....
The
banking debate is not about how to save
the banking industry. American banks
are among the best in the world: well
capitalized, well run, and highly profitable. The banking debate is what to do
about the 1,179 dead and dying banks,
and the 1,492 crippled banks, that together manage more than a third of all
2 '4
banking assets.
Vaughn and Hill focus on new regulatory steps to force banks to high levels
of solvency. Their attention is on the
moral hazard problem of bankers engaging in risky investment behavior in
reliance on the government safety net as
a means for avoiding failure. They recommend steps that would close insolvent banks and limit bank access to
deposit insurance. The regulatory steps
Vaughn and Hill advocate would avoid
putting great stress on government-provided deposit insurance, and would
make the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation successful without recourse
to taxpayer bailouts. "If commercial
bank losses are to be stopped, reform of
the deposit insurance system is essential. While drastic reforms would be
best... more modest reforms-such as
adjusting premiums to reflect risk better
or boosting capital requirements-are
25
the only game in town.
5. Litan's and Pierce's Tailored
Approaches to Regulation
This article has discussed proposals
to eliminate Glass-Steagall firewalls and
McFadden geographic constraints, as
well as proposals for stricter regulation
to assure bank solvency. Another kind
of proposal involves tailored bank reform, as discussed in Litan's What
Should Banks Do?' and Pierce's The
Futureof Banking." The premise of the
tailored regulatory proposals is that
government regulation should be narrowly applied only where needed to
address a serious problem not solvable
by ordinary free market mechanisms.
Application of that premise depends on
one's point of view. A socialist skepti112

cal of free market solutions will be
quicker to find a need for a governmental solution than a strong free market
advocate.
Both Litan and Pierce accept government provided insurance as a desirable goal, and the idea that government
regulation is needed to deal with the
moral hazard problem of bankers taking
great risk in reliance on governmentprovided safety net arrangements that
make failure unlikely. Litan and Pierce
suggest regulations narrowly drawn to
meet those goals, so that bankers' freedom to take business risks is not unnecessarily interfered with.
Litan advocates a regulatory reform
approach that would continue the concept of government insured deposits,
yet permit bankers the expanded field of
activity they want "[Financial conglomerates that choose to offer banking services would be required to organize.. .by
separating deposit taking from lending
activities. Specifically, this approach
would authorize the creation of new
'financial holding companies' (FHCs),
which would be free to engage through
separate subsidiaries in any activity,
financial or non-financial," subject to
certain restrictions. 28 The restrictions
are that the "banks" in FHCs would be
required to operate as insured money
market funds, accepting deposits and
investing only in highly liquid safe securities. Financial holding companies
could extend loans, but only through
separately incorporated subsidiaries
wholly funded by uninsured liabilities
and equity. Only the "narrow banks"
would have access to the Federal Reserve payment system as a source of
funding.29
Pierce endorses a similar narrow bank
concept. Under Pierce's plan, monetary
services such as federally insured accounts payable on demand, checking
accounts, electronic fund transfer, payment, and similar services, are provided
by separately capitalized monetary service companies within the bank structure. Monetary companies are limited

to holding only safe assets. These specialized companies cannot make loans.
Thus, monetary activities are isolated
from all others within banks. All activities other than those of monetary service companies would be placed in
financial service companies, which
would be separate entities that could
exist within a bank's conglomerate corporate structure. The financial service
companies would operate essentially
without federal firewall, geographic
limit, or any other regulation of the
nature and scope of business.30
6. Congress' Solution: The
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvements
Act of 1991
By the time the Vaughn and Hill
book was published, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act of 1991 (FDICIA)31 went
into effect. The FDICIA to some extent
matches the strict regulation approach
suggested by Vaughn and Hill. As explained by Kaufman and Litan in the
introduction to their 1993 work Assessing Bank Reform,32 with the FDICIA
Congress enacted a "new capital-based
system of early regulatory intervention
to reduce the cost of failures to the
FDIC, together with $30 billion in borrowing authority for the FDIC, while
adding a variety of additional regulatory provisions [intended] to protect
consumers and to better ensure the safety
and soundness of banks."3 3 However, it
seems unlikely that the high degree of
regulatory action advocated by Vaughn
and Hill is met by the level of current
enforcement of the FDICIA.
7. Comments of Participants in
the Conference on the FDICIA
Assessing Bank Reform reports on a
conference of scholars, policymakers,
and private sector people who discussed
the 1991 FDICIA and the future of the
United States banking industry.
With regard to financial soundness
of banks, a number of participants in the
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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FDICIA conference reinforce the notion that not too much comfort should
be taken from the small number of recent bank failures. William Haraf of
Citicorp argues that recent strong bank
industry profits are largely the result of
a favorable interest rate and improvement in the economy. Haraf believes
that the continuing decline in bank intermediation functions and the regulatory burdens of FDICIA and other statutes will further shrink the banking industry.34 David Mullins, of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, suggested that "all is not well when
roughly 15 percent of the [banking]
industry's assets-half a trillion dollars-is in troubled institutions."35 Edward Kane, of Boston College, ominously points out that many banks are
"deeply economically insolvent, even
though their accounting ratios are not
yet desperate enough to force federal
regulators to demand recapitalization
or to impose other mandatory disciplines." Kane explains: "The electorate
must understand that there could only
have been a surprise [involving many
bank failures] this December [1992] if
it came from the policies of the new
President and the new Congress. It could
not come from the tangible capital trigger set by the FDICIA. Scheduling a
life-and-death exam one year ahead
and making the right answer to the test
question known in advance gave zombie [banking] firms ample opportunity
to cram effectively for the test."36
The 1993 Litan-Kaufman book contains many references to the real politics of bank reform. Robert Glauber,
former undersecretary of the treasury,
explains that "powerful forces" were
arrayed when Congress considered
broad bank reform legislation supported
by the Bush administration. That legislation would have permitted expanded
bank powers and branching. "First and
foremost, the [proposed] structural
changes were viewed as deregulation,
which many saw as having caused the
S&L debacle.... Second, the chairmen
Volume 6 Number 4 / Summer 1994

of both Senate and House banking committees wanted a 'narrow' bill.... And
finally there were the industry lobbies:
the powerful securities and insurance
lobbies opposed to reform.... [T]he
strongest industry group supporting the
administration [reform] legislation was
the Financial Services Council..., (Ford,
Citicorp, American Express, Sears,
Bankers Trust, John Hancock, among
others)."37
Conclusion
Consumers of bank services, taxpayers, and citizens are capable of intelligently considering regulation issues
raised by the reported financial difficulties of banks, even without prior background in bank regulation. A goal of
this article has been to demonstrate that
the issues are comprehensible. The
books discussed provide accessible discussions of the issues. They teach that it
is quite plausible that many banks are
having financial difficulties, and that
the range of possible responsive regulatory reforms runs from broad deregulation to rigorous new regulation of banks.
In evaluating which regulatory solutions are best, it is important to keep in
mind that the current United States regulatory scheme involves government
deposit insurance and other "safety net"
protections of bank stability. They are
balanced by government restrictions that
limit risky activity by bankers in reliance on the government safety net. Each
of the regulatory proposals advocated
in the books respect that regulatory balance.
The Litan-Pierce proposals are not
panaceas. The proposals do not purport
to address all the regulatory issues of
banking, including such issues as how
the Federal Reserve Board should deal
with its monetary duties in a period of
banking decline, and how the government should deal with possible credit
problems of small and medium sized
businesses. In addition, it is likely that
the need for regulation cannot be entirely contained within the "narrow"
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banks Litan and Pierce propose: the less
regulated "broad" banks will remain
capable of mischief requiring government intervention to protect the consuming public. Nevertheless, the proposals are instructive in suggesting how
to focus bank regulation so that it is
efficient and addresses well defined
problems.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the regulatory solutions that are best are
those most likely to achieve well-defined and important public policy goals
with minimum burden on bank con-.
sumers, taxpayers, and the banks. Applying this standard, the tailored approaches of Litan and Pierce have much
to recommend them. They provide
strong protection of the security of the
deposits of bank customers, but put little
burden on government deposit insurance and few constraints on banks. Both
government support of important banking functions and government limitation of banking endeavors is achieved at
relatively low cost.
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